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David Chalmers claims that the nature of consciousness as a subjective quality 
constitutes an independent subject area and that its existence cannot be reduced to 
anything else. In particular, reductive explanations to physical theories as well as 
functionalism about mental states are hopeless for this purpose (perhaps they assume 
the existence of the conscious mind, in that failing to explain what we seek to 
understand about its very nature). His argument for mind-body dualism, which is 
supposed to sustain the claim above, proceeds as follows: 1) what is conceivable is 
possible; 2) There is at least one conceivable world where one’s physical duplicate has no 
consciousness, which is called a zombie-world; therefore, 3) the zombie-world is possible; 
4) if it is possible, then physicalism or materialism is false; therefore, 5) physicalism is 
false. 
The central concern of this essay is to critically examine Premises 1) and 2). 
Concerning Premise 1), which I shall call the “Conceivability-Possibility Thesis,” some 
precedent arguments based on similar theses can be found throughout the history of 
western philosophy (e.g. the Cartesian argument for mind-body dualism and Hume’s 
denial of the reality of causality), and many contemporary philosophers discuss their 
validity and force (e.g. van Cleve, 1983 & Yablo, 1993). It should be noted, however, that 
Chalmers uniquely defends the thesis, as seen in his developed theory known as 
“epistemic two-dimensionalism,” and I shall begin with its survey (Section 2 and 3). 
Through this examination, it will be realized that 1) and 2) are not independent 
premises, and that 1) can never be established as a general rule applicable to all cases 
until conceivability of the zombie-world is shown to be a priori. I shall argue that no 
such a priori reasoning for non-existence of consciousness is incomplete (Section 4). 
(Note also that if this is correct, the zombie case, pace Chalmers, will fall under the 
“twilight zone” in his terminology and even be in danger of becoming a counter-example 
to his Conceivability-Possibility Thesis. It therefore should be admitted either that 
conceivability of the unconscious mind is incomplete, or that the thesis that is expected 
to encompass something that is merely, or only allegedly conceivable, cannot be 
maintained. In effect, the zombie argument will turn out to be undone. Following this, 
responses to six possible objections will be set forth (Section 5). 
 
 
